UNITED
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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/25768
13 May 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 12 MAY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit to you the statement of 12 May 1993 issued by the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and the statement annexed hereto circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) PAK Gil Yon
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Statement dated 12 May 1993 of the spokesman of the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

An unreasonable "resolution" over the DPRK's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was adopted at the United Nations Security Council on 11 May despite opposition from different countries.

Admission to or withdrawal from an international treaty belongs to the sovereignty of each country.

The DPRK's withdrawal from the NPT was a self-defensive measure taken by the DPRK exercising the right pursuant to the NPT under the extraordinary situation in which the supreme interests of the country were exposed to grave threat.

Therefore, the DPRK's withdrawal from the NPT is not a matter to be discussed at the United Nations Security Council. The United Nations has no legal pretext or ground to adopt a "resolution" over this matter.

It is unreasonable for the United Nations Security Council to talk about "reconsideration" of the DPRK's measure to withdraw from the NPT.

The Charter of the United Nations has no article which stipulates that signatories to an international treaty should not withdraw from the treaty or that issue should be taken with withdrawal from the treaty.

The "double standard" policy of the United Nations Security Council can by no means be justified in conniving at the misconduct of the offender and putting pressure on the victim.

The Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea resolutely rejects the "resolution" of the Security Council, considering it an interference in its internal affairs and a grave infringement on its sovereignty.

What is done by the United States and its followers at the Security Council reminds one of the 1950s when the Korean issue was discussed illegally at the Security Council.

If the latest "resolution" of the Security Council was adopted from motives of following the example of the "resolution" in the 1950s, the situation would get worse.

At a time when negotiations between the DPRK and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are ripe so that the IAEA's inspection of the DPRK and DPRK-U.S. negotiations may be possible, the Security Council stated only yesterday through a "President's Statement" that it was encouraging negotiations and is now blocking them. This is a very abnormal and contradictory act.

This proves that the United States is resorting to means of pressure, not to means of negotiations in the settlement of problems and the Security Council has been appropriated for the schemes of the United States, a belligerent party against the DPRK, to stifle the socialist system of Korea.

Such an unjustifiable "double-dealing" policy of the United States through the Security Council has created grave difficulties in the way of negotiations between the DPRK and the IAEA.

The "nuclear problem" on the Korean peninsula cannot be solved by "strongarm acts" and "pressure".

The United States and its followers, some other members of the Security Council, must not mistake for an expression of weakness the DPRK's stand and efforts to solve the problem through negotiations on the basis of mutual trust.

If the Security Council finally puts such unreasonable "pressure" on us as "sanctions" on the basis of this "resolution", we cannot construe it otherwise than a "declaration of war" against the DPRK.

It is the United States that gave rise to the "nuclear problem" on the Korean peninsula and it is also the United States that initiated the adoption of the "resolution". So, the United States will be held entirely responsible for all the consequences to be entailed therefrom.

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Security Council

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S/25769
13 May 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 4 MAY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF MAURITANIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

In my capacity as Chairman of the Arab Group for the month of May 1993, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith resolution No. 5279 - ninety-ninth session - jim 4 - 19 April 1993, adopted on 19 April 1993 by the Council of the League of Arab States at its ninety-ninth session on the situation in Somalia.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and the annexed resolution circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohamedou OULD MOHAMED MAHMOUD
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
Mauritania to the United Nations
Chairman of the Arab Group

Annex

The situation in Somalia

The Council of the League of Arab States,

Having taken cognizance of:

- the note by the General Secretariat and

- the recommendation of the Political Affairs Committee,

Having considered the developments in the situation in Somalia in the light of the Arab and international efforts to restore security and stability to Somalia, to preserve its unity, to rehabilitate its economy and to achieve a comprehensive national reconciliation in Somalia,

Being informed of the efforts of the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States and his contacts with the Somali parties and with the international and regional organizations, which have made an effective contribution to the joint efforts to bring security, peace and stability to Somalia,

Expressing its appreciation for the efforts made by the United Nations, the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity and the Organization of the Islamic Conference to reach a political settlement which preserves the unity and territorial integrity of Somalia and restores security, stability and peace there,

Welcoming Security Council resolution 814 (1993) of 26 March 1993 on the situation in Somalia, which it considers a positive and forward-looking step to rescue Somalia from its ordeal,

Warmly welcoming the Somali National Reconciliation Agreement signed at Addis Ababa between the various Somali parties on 27 March 1993 and the effective contribution of the United Nations and the regional organizations concerned,

Reaffirming its previous resolutions on Somalia and the need for all the Somali parties to observe the cease-fire and to restrict themselves to fraternal dialogue in order to solve the conflict by peaceful means,

Decides

1. To invite all the Somali parties to cooperate fully with the United Nations and the regional organizations concerned in the implementation of the National Reconciliation Agreement signed on 27 March 1993 at Addis Ababa;

2. To provide material and moral assistance to the Somali National Transition Council and to enable it to carry out its task of restoring security, stability and peace in Somalia in cooperation with the United Nations;

3. To reaffirm its previous resolutions on the provision of humanitarian assistance to Somalia;

4. To invite its member States to contribute to the international efforts for the reconstruction of Somalia in various fields;

5. That the specialized Arab agencies, the Arab ministerial councils and the Arab development funds, each in its field of specialization, should provide aid and technical assistance to the Somali people;

6. To enable the General Secretariat to play its role in coordinating the delivery of Arab aid to Somalia. The member States should rapidly remit their financial contributions to the account for aid to Somalia opened by the Council of the League of Arab States pursuant to its resolution 5157; the member States should each in turn supply the General Secretariat with statements listing the aid they are providing to Somalia;

7. To urge its member States to make contributions towards defraying the costs of the Somali diplomatic and consular missions, as well as the permanent missions of Somalia to international organizations.

(Resolution No. 5279 - ninety-ninth session - jim 4 - 19 April 1993)

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/25770
13 May 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 12 MAY 1993 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to my letters of 31 March (S/23773) and 2 April 1992 (S/23774) to the President of the Security Council and to the President's reply of 2 April 1992 (S/23775) concerning the composition of the military component of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).

Having completed the necessary consultations, I propose that Namibia be added to the list of Member States contributing military personnel to UNTAC.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

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UNITED
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GENERAL

S/25771
13 May 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 13 MAY 1993 FROM PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 12 May 1993 (S/25770) concerning the addition of one country to the list of Member States contributing military personnel to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) has been brought to the attention of the members of the Council. They endorse the proposal contained in your letter.

(Signed) Yuliy M. VORONTSOV
President of the Security Council

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S/25772
13 May 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 12 MAY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government and further to my letter dated 28 April 1993 (S/25689), I have the honour to inform you that the Iranian armed forces have again bombarded Iraqi border territory in the northern part of Iraq, inflicting losses of lives and property.

On the morning of 7 May 1993, the Iranian artillery bombarded the Iraqi areas of Pusht and Parwin, which led to the displacement of Iraqi Kurdish families, who fled their homes in these areas and moved further inside Iraqi territory in order to escape the savage Iranian bombardment and in fear of anticipated Iranian aggression.

The Government of the Republic of Iraq protests vehemently at this fresh Iranian act of aggression against Iraq, which constitutes a flagrant violation of Iraq's sovereignty and blatant intervention in its internal affairs, and condemns the Iranian regime's persistence in violating Security Council resolution 598 (1987) by its commission of these acts of aggression.

The Government of the Republic of Iraq, while calling on you to intervene to prevent the Iranian side from repeating such acts of aggression, which are incompatible with the norms of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, reserves its full right to respond by using any appropriate means to protect Iraq's rights and legitimate interests.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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General Assembly Security Council

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A/48/167
S/25773
13 May 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-eighth session
Item 36 of the preliminary list*
LAW OF THE SEA

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-eighth year

Letter dated 12 May 1993 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you the texts of two statements issued by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on 7 May 1993 concerning the extension of the maritime zone around South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands (see annex I) and the conservation of marine resources in the area in accordance with the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (see annex II).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annexes could be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under item 36 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) D. H. A. HANNAY

* A/48/50.

ANNEX I

Text of a statement issued by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on 7 May 1993 concerning the extension of the maritime zone around South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands

In recent years, Her Majesty's Government has become increasingly concerned about the conservation of marine resources around South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands in the South Atlantic, which is a British Dependent Territory. Until 7 May this year, the Crown's sovereignty and jurisdiction around South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands extended to the 12-mile limit of the territorial sea. For waters beyond this, we had relied solely on the work of the Commission created by the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), a component of the Antarctic Treaty System. This depends on flag State regulation and policing to apply conservation measures decided by consensus amongst the 22 members. We fully support CCAMLR and cooperate in the body's work. We have worked most energetically to strengthen the role of CCAMLR in its regulation of southern ocean fisheries. Although CCAMLR has provided timely and much-needed protection for commercially-fished species, we are concerned that nevertheless fish stocks have been depleted.

Moreover, infringements of CCAMLR regulations have grown. The need to reinforce conservation arrangements in the area for which Her Majesty's Government is responsible is clear. Accordingly, Ministers decided to strengthen conservation and management of marine resources around South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands by the introduction of national measures. These measures are intended to supplement, not replace, the role of CCAMLR and are of course fully compatible with it.

For this reason, the Commissioner for South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands issued a Proclamation on 7 May 1993 to provide for the exercise of the Crown's sovereign rights to jurisdiction over a maritime zone. This action will reinforce existing measures under CCAMLR.

Since their re-establishment in 1990, our relations with Argentina have progressed to their present excellent state and are now marked by a new openness and growing mutual confidence. This is a source of great satisfaction to Her Majesty's Government, which will continue to work to develop the relationship further. Against this background, it was natural for us to discuss our concerns over conservation fully with the Argentine Government, with which we have extensive exchanges on South Atlantic matters, particularly in relation to fisheries. We look forward to pursuing this dialogue.

ANNEX II

Text of a further statement issued by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on 7 May 1993 concerning the conservation of marine resources

The Argentine Republic has today reasserted its purported claims in respect of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands and the waters surrounding those Islands. In enacting its Law No. 23968 in November 1991, the Argentine Republic repeated those claims to jurisdiction over the maritime areas concerned over which the United Kingdom has sovereign rights in international law. Her Majesty's Government does not accept such Argentine claims. We have no doubts about our sovereignty over South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands and our consequent entitlements to maritime jurisdiction in accordance with international law around that territory.

Her Majesty's Government recognizes the strength and importance of the continuing relationship with Argentina, places a high value on the continuing strength of those relations and acknowledges the need to work together for mutual benefit and the achievement of conservation objectives in the South Atlantic. Her Majesty's Government is committed to tight conservation controls in the waters covered by the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources and supports the continuing and effective role of the Commission established by that Convention.

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S/25774
13 May 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 11 MAY 1993 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to bring to your attention the attached letter from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in which he requests circulation as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

Annex

Letter dated 11 May 1993 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) addressed to the Secretary-General

I refer to the letter of 10 May 1993 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to the President of the Security Council contained in document S/25747. In this connection and further to my report, on behalf of the IAEA Board of Governors, to the Security Council and the General Assembly (A/48/133 and S/25556), I have the honour to state as follows:

In implementing the Safeguards Agreement between the DPRK and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the IAEA secretariat has been guided by the Agency's Statute, and by the relevant provisions of the Safeguards Agreement. In conformity with the Agreement, I have reported to the Board of Governors of IAEA on results of the implementation of the Agreement and provided information concerning objections raised by the DPRK to the Agency's right of access to safeguard relevant sites. In its resolution of 18 March 1993, adopted without a vote, the Board has expressed, inter alia, "its full confidence in the Director General and the Secretariat and its support for the actions they have taken to implement the Safeguards Agreement with the DPRK in an impartial and objective manner".

I should be grateful if this letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hans BLIX

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S/25775
14 May 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 11 MAY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you some information concerning the adverse consequences which the aggression perpetrated by the alliance under the cover of international legitimacy has had on health services and education in Iraq. Among other adverse consequences, there has been an increase in infant mortality in all age groups.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a Security Council document.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Children of all ages have always suffered the long-term consequences of war and conflict. In its report on the health of Iraqi children which it published in October 1991, the Harvard team studying world health noted that conflicts had always been considered detrimental to the health of children, and that the Gulf war, combined with the economic embargo and the insecurity in which the population lived, had also had detrimental effects.

Since the imposition of a comprehensive economic embargo against Iraq, infant mortality rates have increased considerably in a very short space of time, on account of malnutrition and a shortage of basic medicine. Moreover, the lack of drinking water and the catastrophic health conditions prevailing in the country have led to a proliferation of illnesses very closely linked to such factors, including cholera, typhoid and dysentery.

The tables below illustrate the effects which the embargo against Iraq has had on mortality rates among children under the age of 5 and among adults over the age of 50. They indicate, for selected months, the number of deaths that occurred before and after the imposition of the embargo.

Children under the age of 5

Month	Year	Malnutrition	Diarrhoeal diseases	Anaemia
July	1989	138	142	98
	1992	1 116	873	324
August	1989	90	159	35
	1992	923	1 644	527
October	1989	73	706	93
	1992	717	1 063	903
November	1989	52	96	110
	1992	592	1 102	1 272
December	1989	81	101	117
	1992	872	1 090	1 260
January	1989	93	121	139
	1993	1 944	1 380	1 789
February	1989	94	104	158
	1993	1 783	976	1 293

Adults over the age of 50

Month	Year	Hypertension	Diabetes	Malignant Tumours
July	1989	122	62	246
	1992	253	147	589
August	1989	81	81	316
	1992	165	129	424
October	1989	123	65	206
	1992	266	132	432
November	1989	113	87	222
	1992	213	176	411
December	1989	82	90	347
	1992	123	130	519
January	1990	104	83	267
	1993	1 109	966	749
February	1990	90	71	318
	1993	262	172	731

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S/25776
14 May 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 12 MAY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ARMENIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instruction from my Government, I have the honour to forward to you the fax-transmitted letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, Mr. Vahan Papazian.

I should be grateful if you would circulate this as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Alexander ARZOUMANIAN
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 11 May 1993 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia addressed to the Secretary-General

I thank you for your communication of 5 May 1993, formally transmitting the text of the recent United Nations Security Council resolution 822 (1993).

Armenia supports the demands of the Security Council in the order introduced in resolution 822 and is ready to assume responsibility for all actions which are relevant to Armenia. The Government of Armenia too has been calling for the immediate cessation of all hostilities leading to a durable cease-fire, the immediate return of all parties to the conflict to the negotiating table, and the withdrawal of Nagorny Karabagh Self-Defense Forces from Kelbajar district with real guarantees that the district will no longer represent a threat to the security of the people and borders of Nagorny Karabagh.

Unfortunately, the Government of Azerbaijan has failed to comply with the spirit and letter of resolution 822 by refusing to return to the CSCE negotiation process. In the absence of negotiations, it has been impossible to produce an agreement which could have enabled Armenia and Nagorny Karabagh to comply with the above-mentioned demands of the Security Council.

The Government of Armenia would also point out that by continuing its military offensives against Nagorny Karabagh and Armenia Azerbaijan is violating yet another demand of the United Nations Security Council resolution.

Azerbaijan has failed to comply also with the demand of the resolution to end "hostile actions" by maintaining its blockade of Armenia and Nagorny Karabagh and intensifying its psychological war against Armenia and the Armenian people.

In this respect, Armenia deplores the abuse by the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations of the services provided by the United Nations Secretariat. The daily dissemination of fabricated, war-mongering and hate-filled propaganda was certainly not the purpose of accessing United Nations Secretariat services and can, under no circumstances, be construed to be in the interest of peace.

Finally, Armenia regrets to inform you that despite the provisions of the same resolution, the Republic of Turkey continues to deny Armenia access to humanitarian assistance.

Under the circumstances, you may find it useful to appoint a Special Representative in the region who could provide the Secretary-General with accurate information regarding the implementation by the various parties of all provisions of resolution 822 (1993). Armenia believes regular reports by a

special United Nations representative would provide an effective mechanism to promote the realization of a durable cease-fire and a negotiated solution to the Nagorny Karabagh conflict.

(Signed) Vahan PAPAZIAN

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Security Council

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S/25777
15 May 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 815 (1993)

INTRODUCTION

1. In paragraph 3 of its resolution 815 (1993) of 30 March 1993, the Security Council decided to reconsider one month after the date of that resolution or at any time at the request of the Secretary-General, the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), in the light of developments of the International Conference in the former Yugoslavia (ICFY) and the situation on the ground. In paragraph 6 of the same resolution, the Council requested the Secretary-General to report urgently to the Council on how the United Nations Peace Plan for Croatia could be effectively implemented. In paragraph 4, the Council also decided to extend UNPROFOR's mandate for an additional interim period terminating on 30 June 1993. The following report is therefore submitted to provide the Council with an interim assessment of developments relating to UNPROFOR's mandate in Croatia.

I. THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING PLAN FOR CROATIA

2. The United Nations mandate in Croatia derives principally from the following Security Council resolutions: resolution 743 (1992) of 21 February 1992, which established UNPROFOR in accordance with the Peace-keeping Plan (S/23280, annex III) concerning the United Nations protected areas (UNPAs) in Croatia; resolution 762 (1992) of 30 June 1992, which established a Joint Commission to oversee the progressive return of the "pink zones" to Croatian authority; resolution 769 (1992) of 7 August 1992, which provided for UNPROFOR to establish border controls at international crossing points leading into the UNPAs; resolution 779 (1992) of 6 October 1992, which dealt with the Prevlaka peninsula and approved UNPROFOR's taking control of the Peruca dam; resolution 802 (1993) of 25 January 1993, calling for a cease-fire and other steps subsequent to the Croatian armed incursion of 22 January 1993; resolution 807 (1993) of 19 February 1993, making further provisions following upon the events of 22 January and thereafter, and extending UNPROFOR's mandate until 31 March 1993; and resolution 815 (1993) of 30 March 1993, which extended UNPROFOR for another interim period until 30 June 1993. The Secretary-General has reported regularly to the Council regarding the progress made by UNPROFOR in respect of these main resolutions.

3. The Peace-keeping Plan for Croatia provided for the withdrawal of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and the demilitarization of the UNPAs, the return of refugees, the re-establishment of police forces, and associated matters relating to the intended process of normalization. As most recently reported on 10 February 1993 (S/25264 and Corr.1), the experience of UNPROFOR in this respect has been mixed. Non-cooperation by the local Serb authorities in several respects, and consequent military and other actions by the Croatian authorities, have prevented the successful implementation of the Plan. The direct and indirect consequences of the Croatian incursion of 22 January have been particularly destructive. The Secretary-General has reported to the Council that UNPROFOR has not been able to establish the conditions of peace and security that would have permitted the voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes (ibid., para. 13).

4. The basic assumption underlying the Peace-keeping Plan at the time was that it was of an interim nature, that it would remain in effect only until an overall political solution had been reached and that it did not prejudge the outcome of negotiations. It was further assumed that these negotiations would be undertaken by the Conference on Yugoslavia established by the European Community under the chairmanship of Lord Carrington. A principle of that Conference, established by agreement on 4 October 1991, was that there would be no unilateral changes of borders (S/23169, para. 21). In theory, therefore, the possibility existed that the problem between the Republic of Croatia and the Serb population living in the UNPAs and the Pink Zones could be settled by an agreed adjustment of frontiers. During the negotiation of the Peace-keeping Plan, however, it was repeatedly emphasized to the local Serb leadership in what were to become the UNPAs that, in practice, the only basis for a settlement was their acceptance of Croatian sovereignty in return for guarantees of their minority rights. They never accepted this position or concealed their determination to press for independence from Croatia.

5. By August 1992, when the ICFY replaced the European Community's Conference on Yugoslavia as the forum for the negotiation of a settlement, a number or political developments had changed the framework within which such a settlement could be obtained. With the admission of Croatia as a State Member of the United Nations in May 1992, it became implicitly clear that a settlement had to be sought without change to the internationally recognized borders of that State. This was made explicit when the Security Council, in paragraph 5 of its resolution 815 (1993), resolved that it supported "the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia in their efforts to help to define the future status of those territories comprising the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs), which are integral parts of the territory of the Republic of Croatia ..."

6. The Co-Chairmen had anyway been conducting their negotiations on this basis. But the Security Council has now made it clear formally that the international community will not entertain the claim of the local Serb authorities to recognition as a sovereign entity (the so-called "Republic of Serb Krajina"). The aspiration of the local Serbs to sovereignty has to a large extent determined their attitude towards the presence of UNPROFOR and the provisions of the Peace-keeping Plan. Their refusal to demilitarize has been based on their fear of absorption by force into Croatia.

7. An additional area of non-cooperation by the local Serbs has related to the implementation of Security Council resolution 769 (1992), which authorizes UNPROFOR to establish border controls at the international borders of the UNPAs. In the absence of such border controls, the Security Council, in paragraph 12 of its resolution 820 (1993), which imposes additional sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), established a regime which provides that import to, export from and transshipment through the UNPAs in the Republic of Croatia and those areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces, with the exception of essential humanitarian supplies including medical supplies and foodstuffs distributed by international humanitarian agencies, shall be permitted only with proper authorization from the Government of the Republic of Croatia or the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina respectively. On 27 April 1993, a meeting was held between UNPROFOR and the Serb authorities at which attempts were again made to secure their agreement to the implementation of resolution 769 (1992). At that meeting, the Serb side declared that, in view of resolution 820 (1993), such agreement could not at that time be considered and that they regarded the idea of Croatia regulating the commerce and trade of the UNPAs as being in direct breach of the Peace-keeping Plan.

8. As regards resolution 802 (1993), representatives of the Co-Chairmen in New York, Geneva and elsewhere have negotiated at great length with both parties to secure an agreement to implement the cease-fire and related provisions. On 6 April 1993, a provisional agreement was signed which required the endorsement of both sides (S/25555, annex). Although UNPROFOR has held three lengthy meetings with the local Serb authorities to explain how it would implement the agreement operationally, and to clarify other related matters, no such endorsement had been forthcoming from the Serb side as of 10 May 1993.

II. PEACEMAKING

9. The Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the ICFY have attempted to pursue negotiations with both sides in recent weeks. It is clear that the relationship between Croats and Serbs in the Republic of Croatia is of fundamental importance to the settlement of the crisis. Unfortunately, because of what has happened in recent months, the prospects for the amicable coexistence of the two groups have receded, and if current trends are not quickly reversed, the situation may deteriorate further. The position of minority groups, which was tending to stabilize both inside and outside the UNPAs, has worsened since the events of 22 January 1993. Remaining Croats in the UNPAs have in many cases been relentlessly persecuted, suffering murder, assault, threats, armed thefts and arson. UNPROFOR has had to establish protected villages and, in the last resort, was forced to help relocate several hundred vulnerable civilians to security in Croatia with the cooperation, and sometimes at the insistence, of the Croatian Government. It has been a tragic humanitarian situation, totally at variance with UNPROFOR's duty under the Peace-keeping Plan to try to reintegrate Croat and Serb communities.

10. At the same time, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has reported the continued movement out of Croatia of many members of the Croatian-Serb population, often to Serbia. According to UNHCR figures dated 19 March 1993, the number of Serb refugees and displaced persons

who have fled from Croatia to Serbia and the UNPAs (approximately 251,000) now exceeds the number of Croats who were displaced from the UNPAs to Croatia.

11. It is apparent that three conditions must be met in order to provide a reasonable basis for a lasting peace:

(a) The sovereignty and integrity of the State of Croatia has to be respected;

(b) The Croat majority's basic interests have to be safeguarded and at the same time reconciled with the rights of the minority and political autonomy for the Krajina;

(c) Members of the Serb population in Croatia must be able to feel secure within the boundaries of the State, so that they do not look outside it for their fundamental safety.

12. To achieve this in the current circumstances in Croatia will require a major endeavour on the part of all concerned, under the auspices of the international community. Serb leaders in the UNPAs continue to reject the idea of being part of Croatia, asserting that "minority" status within the Republic of Croatia is unacceptable to them. Nevertheless, the various elements of the Peace-keeping Plan, and the efforts of the Co-Chairmen to negotiate arrangements for a durable solution, constitute steps in the right direction. However, the Force Commander reports, and I agree, that there should be no illusions: it is by no means clear that either group is yet ready to accept the self-limitations that would be required, nor to adopt the tolerance of ethnic or cultural pluralism which is the only guarantee of continuous stability in the State and the region. It has to be emphasized that such a solution could take some time, while confidence is re-established.

III. PRESENT SITUATION IN THE UNPAs AND PINK ZONES

13. As a consequence of the various developments described in section I above, and the lack of progress in the peacemaking efforts led by the Co-Chairmen, the present situation in the UNPAs and "pink zones" gives rise to great concern. The continuance of hostilities despite resolution 802 (1993), including repeated shelling, by both sides, of purely civilian targets, and reports of further imminent incursions, have caused tensions in the UNPAs to rise to a degree not previously encountered since the establishment of UNPROFOR. For instance, at purely civilian locations at Gospic, Zadar, Sibenik, Benkovac, Obrovac and Kistanje, shelling by mortar, artillery, tanks and rockets has become a frequent occurrence, causing deaths and other casualties, and damaging hospitals, schools and homes. On 21 April, a member of UNPROFOR'S joint Czech and Slovak battalion was killed by Croatian army shelling while fulfilling his responsibilities on behalf of UNPROFOR. The Force Commander has protested in the strongest terms in both Zagreb and Knin against these flagrant breaches of humanitarian law.

14. Restrictions imposed by the local Serb authorities on UNPROFOR's freedom of movement have been much more acute, especially in sectors North and South. All elements of UNPROFOR have been affected, but the impact on the work of United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs) and United Nations Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL)

has been particularly drastic. At times, they have been unable to move out of the main towns, and their ability to report on cease-fire matters and other events in the areas of conflict, and in respect of humanitarian situations, has been seriously weakened. Elsewhere, crossing points have frequently been closed, preventing normal passage of logistical and humanitarian convoys. Restrictions on UNPROFOR aerial movement have also been imposed, with even reconnaissance flights permitted only after negotiation of air corridors.

15. Serb attitudes towards UNPROFOR have also gravely deteriorated. In one instance, on 7 April 1993, two Nigerian soldiers were murdered at a checkpoint, and another injured. Other casualties have occurred (since 27 March, 12 other incidents of attacks on UNPROFOR have occurred, in which one UNPROFOR soldier was killed and five were wounded), and there are daily manifestations of hostility to the UNPROFOR presence, often accompanied by the pointing and cocking of weapons and aggressive behaviour at checkpoints. On 7 and 14 April, at meetings held to try to resolve these problems, the local Serb authorities told UNPROFOR's Deputy Chief of Mission that, while they regretted these various trends and incidents, and would like UNPROFOR to remain in a protective role, they were unable to restrain their population who now tended to see UNPROFOR as a hostile presence. They stated that they would like to accept UNPROFOR as a "genuine protection force", but asserted that recent developments had destroyed the basis of confidence in the Force's impartiality. Hostility has been especially marked towards battalions of certain nationalities, whose members have been forced to take special precautions for their own protection. Threats have also been conveyed to take hostage, or to exact revenge upon, UNPROFOR personnel, should any acts of armed force be undertaken by foreign Governments against Serb personnel or locations in various parts of the former Yugoslavia.

16. Though UNPROFOR continues to make daily attempts to elicit the cooperation of the Serb leadership in the UNPAs, the fundamental problem remains their unwillingness to accept the premises of UNPROFOR's mandate as defined in Security Council resolutions. On 30 April 1993, the Secretary-General received a letter from the Serb authorities asking him, inter alia, to clarify whether the original Peace-keeping Plan still existed, to "relocate" UNPROFOR "along the line of confrontation as it existed in January 1993" and stating that if their demands were not met, "somebody will have to accept responsibility before history for the possible escalation of military conflicts."

17. As the above summary of the situation in UNPROFOR's area of responsibility indicates, UNPROFOR is severely handicapped in performing its functions and its personnel are in peril. In the circumstances, it is currently not possible for UNPROFOR to fulfil its mandate in Croatia.

IV. OBSERVATIONS

18. The Council will recall that, in my report of 15 February 1992 recommending the establishment of the Force (S/23592), I had expressed my concerns about the complexities and dangers of the Yugoslav situation and stated that "there remain a number of unanswered questions about the extent to which the Force will in practice receive the necessary cooperation." (para. 28). Developments since then have done little to alleviate my original apprehension. The Serb side has taken the presence of UNPROFOR as a licence to freeze the status quo in place,

under UNPROFOR "protection", while establishing a "state" of the "Republic of Serb Krajina" in UNPROFOR's area of responsibility. The Croatian side, meanwhile, has insisted that since the Plan was drafted, the "overall political solution" that was sought at the time has been found with the recognition of Croatia and its admission to the United Nations; the Serbs must therefore accept the authority of Zagreb, which they had rebelled against in the first place. There is very little, if any, common ground between the two sides on this question.

19. Though UNPROFOR has succeeded in ensuring the complete withdrawal of JNA, in maintaining peace and in reducing the intimidation of civilians in the UNPAs, it has not been able to fulfil other aspects of the original Peace-keeping Plan. The Serbs have failed to demilitarize the UNPAs as called for in Security Council resolution 743 (1992), and as a result little progress has been made towards the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes in the UNPAs. They have also refused to cooperate with UNPROFOR in the implementation of resolutions 762 (1992) (return of the "pink zones" to Croatian authority) and 769 (1992) (control of the borders of the UNPAs). They have also imposed restrictions on UNPROFOR's freedom of movement, especially in Sector South, which have crippled UNPROFOR's monitoring function. The Croatian side, in turn, has manifested its impatience with the United Nations by three times (June 1992, January 1993, April 1993) launching military offensives across the lines of confrontation. The view of the Government of Croatia (reiterated most recently in documents S/25447, S/25601 and S/25766) is that UNPROFOR should be given enforcement powers to oblige the Serbs to comply with Security Council resolutions, and to do so with specific objectives against a set timetable, failing which the Government has made it clear it will not agree to further extensions of UNPROFOR's mandate.

20. It is my view that, given the virtually irreconcilable positions above, the Security Council has three options:

(a) To declare the mandate unworkable in view of Serb non-cooperation, and to withdraw the Force. Though I am concerned that such a step would almost certainly lead to resumption of hostilities, which the United Nations would again be called upon to end, I believe it must be considered. At a time of considerable demands upon United Nations peace-keeping around the world, it is anomalous that the present deployment of UNPROFOR is found unsatisfactory by both sides, and that any conceivable change would require more optimism than the facts on the ground appear to warrant. Since any new proposals to change the situation described in parts I and II of the present report would require the consent of both parties, and since such consent is clearly not available, the Security Council could decide not to waste the limited resources of the international community by retaining in Croatia a large force whose mandate has proved to be un-implementable. The Council has already learned from the case of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) that the prolongation of a peace-keeping force whose mandate cannot be implemented becomes an expensive and open-ended commitment, with a considerable risk of casualties. By announcing its intention to withdraw UNPROFOR at the end of the present mandate (30 June), the Security Council would be sending a clear signal to the parties that only willingness on their part to negotiate seriously would persuade the international community to keep the Force in being. A variation on this approach would be to decide that UNPROFOR would be withdrawn unless the two

sides made progress in political negotiations before the end of the present mandate;

(b) To accept the Croatian view and approve enforcement action to exact compliance from the Serbs. This would be tantamount to putting UNPROFOR at war with the Serbs in the UNPAs and "pink zones". Neither the Force Commander nor I myself consider that the international community should become a party to the conflict, using military force to impose a solution on one side in what remains an inter-ethnic dispute. Nor is it clear that troop contributors would agree to make their soldiers available for such a purpose. The present size and armament of the Force would, in any event, be grossly inadequate for such a task. The enforcement option would thus also require the Security Council to expand UNPROFOR significantly. Even if Member States were to make enough troops available for the purpose, which I do not judge to be likely, I am not in a position to recommend to the Security Council that this would be a proper or worthwhile use of the United Nations limited military resources;

(c) To leave UNPROFOR in place, with no change in mandate but with limited enhancements of its military capacity. The only justification for this option is the high risks associated with the other two. In the short term, UNPROFOR would try to limit the hostilities. In the long term, it would be hoped that sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and mounting international pressure on the Bosnian Serbs, as well as intensified peacemaking efforts by the Co-Chairmen, would strengthen those elements amongst the Krajina Serbs who wish to cooperate in the implementation of the Security Council resolutions, thus permitting UNPROFOR to carry out its original mandate.

21. The disadvantages of this option are clear. First, the Force would remain on the same "peace-keeping" basis as at present and would thus require a degree of consent and cooperation from the parties that it does not at present enjoy, and which the Force by itself can do little to obtain until a change in the external political environment occurs. Secondly, this option would also require a change of position by the Government of Croatia, since the Security Council would in effect be asking the Croatian authorities to tolerate the status quo for a further period in the expectation of a change at an unspecified time in the future. The position of the Croatian Government has consistently been that it is not prepared to wait indefinitely for the restoration of its authority in UNPROFOR's area of responsibility. Should the Council approve this option, it would be necessary to obtain the consent of the Government of Croatia. If the Government's position remained unchanged, the Force would have to be withdrawn.

22. The retention of the Force in Croatia beyond 30 June 1993 would require the following enhancements to UNPROFOR's strength, which the Force Commander judges to be the minimum necessary:

(a) The upgrading of the Czech "mini-battalion" to full battalion strength, i.e., an additional 400 all ranks;

(b) An increase of 20 armoured personnel carriers (APCs) in each of the eight battalions which have not so far been provided with an adequate APC capacity, i.e., a total of 160 APCs, to improve the Force's defensive capacity and mobility;

(c) The addition of 50 United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs), to be distributed throughout the sectors, to enhance UNPROFOR's ability to observe and report. The UNMOs should be equipped with armoured (but unarmed) patrol cars.

23. Having considered these three options very carefully, I have concluded that it would not be advisable for me at this moment to recommend that the Council adopt any of the options. The political and military situation, not only in Croatia but also in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, is highly volatile. I have also just appointed Thorvald Stoltenberg as the new United Nations Co-Chairman of the Steering Committee of the ICFY and also as my Special Representative in the former Yugoslavia. Before making a recommendation to the Council about the future of UNPROFOR in Croatia, I would prefer to await a report from Mr. Stoltenberg after his forthcoming visit to the area.

24. In the circumstances described in the present report, it is also vital that the cease-fire agreement required by resolution 802 (1993) be implemented as soon as possible. As soon as the Serb side ratifies the agreement signed at Geneva, UNPROFOR will implement it, initially by redeploying its existing military forces and police. As explained in my earlier report (S/25555), such redeployment cannot be sustained without reinforcement, which would require:

(a) Two battalions of mechanized infantry of some 1800 all ranks;

(b) Two engineer companies of some 300 all ranks;

(c) Fifty UNMOs.

The implementation of resolution 802 (1993) is not only essential but would also help to regenerate momentum towards peaceful conditions and normalization which could help UNPROFOR to fulfil its tasks. However, UNPROFOR has neither the mandate nor the resources to impose the implementation of the resolution on the parties.

25. While the Council considers the above enhancements to the Force in Croatia, I would request it to approve an unrelated strengthening of the French battalion in Sarajevo by a further 150 all ranks, which the Force Commander judges necessary on the basis of the operational experience of the Force in that city.

26. In this connection, I must express my grave concern about the failure of Member States to pay their assessments to UNPROFOR in full and on time, as a result of which reimbursements to troop contributors have fallen several months behind schedule. Nine Member States contributing infantry battalions to UNPROFOR have formally conveyed to the Secretariat their difficulties with this delayed reimbursement. One State has announced its intention to leave the Force, and two others who have been approached to increase their participation have indicated that they would have serious financial problems in fulfilling the request. At the moment, therefore, the Secretariat knows of no Member State willing to contribute an infantry battalion to UNPROFOR, even if the implementation of the cease-fire agreement described in paragraph 24 above becomes feasible. I should like to appeal once again to Member States to honour their financial obligations to the Organization, without which the viability of United Nations peace-keeping will be threatened.

27. In conclusion, I should like to reiterate that it is of the highest importance that, parallel to the work of the peace-keeping force, a process of active negotiation under the auspices of the ICFY be pursued as soon as possible to find long-term political solutions to the question of the UNPAs and, indeed, to that of the relationship between Croats and Serbs in Croatia.

28. Preliminary estimates of the costs of the proposals made in paragraphs 22, 23 and 24 above will be circulated shortly as an addendum to the present report.

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25777/Corr.1
18 May 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 815 (1993)

Corrigendum

Page 9, paragraph 28

The paragraph should read

> Preliminary estimates of the costs of the proposals made in paragraphs 22, 24 and 25 above will be circulated shortly as an addendum to the present report.

93-29011 (E) 180593

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UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25777/Add.1
25 May 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 815 (1993)

Addendum

1. In my report of 15 May 1993 1/ to the Security Council, I indicated in paragraph 28 that the preliminary estimates of the costs to the United Nations of the proposals made in that report would be circulated as an addendum.

2. The additional responsibilities to be undertaken by the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) are indicated in paragraph 20 (c) of the main report and the proposed increase in the strength of UNPROFOR are set out in paragraphs 22, 24 and 25 thereof. As indicated in those paragraphs, the enhancement of the Force in Croatia would require an additional 400 troops all ranks and 50 military observers. The implementation of the cease-fire agreement would require 2,100 troops all ranks consisting of two mechanized infantry battalions of some 1,800, and two engineer companies of some 300 all ranks as well as 50 military observers. The strengthening of the Force in Sarajevo would require an additional 150 troops all ranks. These requirements would provide for a total of 2,650 additional troops and 100 additional military observers.

3. It is estimated that the cost associated with the enhancements proposed in paragraphs 22, 24 and 25 will amount to some $91.2 million for an initial six-month period. The breakdown of this amount by individual proposal is as follows: $22.2 million for paragraph 22, $65 million for paragraph 24 and $4 million for paragraph 25. It is further estimated that the combined monthly cost thereafter will be approximately $9.7 million. A breakdown of the estimated costs for each proposal for the first six-month period, by main categories of expenditure, is provided for information purposes in the annex to the present addendum.

4. It would be my recommendation to the General Assembly, should the Security Council decide to approve the proposed course of action and enlarge the mandate and strength of UNPROFOR, that the additional cost relating thereto should be considered an expense of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations and that the assessments to be levied on Member States be credited to the UNPROFOR special account.

Notes

1/ S/25777 and Corr.1.

Annex

Cost estimate of the additional costs to the United Nations for the activities of UNPROFOR

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	Objects of expenditure	Initial six months		
		Paragraph 22	Paragraph 24	Paragraph 25
1.	Military component:			
	(a) Military observers	1 157	1 156	-
	(b) Contingent personnel	3 406	19 161	1 277
	(c) Other costs pertaining to contingents	5 923	6 080	682
2.	Civilian staff costs a/	-	758	-
3.	Premises/accommodation	2 896	16 511	1 101
4.	Air operations	-	1 377	-
5.	Transport operations	5 897	4 347	168
6.	Communications	713	4 433	48
7.	Miscellaneous equipment	1 257	6 943	429
8.	Miscellaneous supplies, services freight and support costs	937	4 252	306
	Total	22 186	65 018	4 011

a/ Provides for 8 international staff and 59 locally recruited staff.

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25778
14 May 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 13 MAY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that United States aircraft continued their violations of Iraqi national airspace for purposes of surveillance and provocation during the period 6 to 10 May 1993.

6 May 1993

(a) Northern region: 26 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 7,000 to 10,000 metres, centred on Mosul, Dohuk, Irbil, Amadiyah and Tall Afar.

(b) Southern region: 28 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 7,000 to 9,000 metres, centred on Basra, Samawah, Nasiriyah, Amarah and Busayyah.

7 May 1993

(a) Northern region: 36 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 8,000 metres, centred on Mosul, Dohuk, Irbil, Amadiyah and Tall Afar.

(b) Southern region: 28 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 7,000 to 10,000 metres, centred on Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Ushbayjah, Qal'at Sukkar, Busayyah and Qurnah.

8 May 1993

(a) Northern region: 22 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,500 to 8,000 metres, centred on Mosul, Zakho, Dohuk, Irbil, Ayn Zalah, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 42 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 7,000 to 10,000 metres, centred on Qurnah, Qal'at Salih, Khidr, Nasiriyah, Shatrah, Samawah, Busayyah, Salman, Jalibah and Artawi.

9 May 1993

(a) Northern region: No hostile air activity was reported in the region on this day.

(b) Southern region: 46 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 7,000 to 10,000 metres, centred on Nasiriyah, Salman, Samawah, Basra, Shatrah and Busayyah.

10 May 1993

(a) Northern region: 15 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 7,000 to 8,000 metres, centred on Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.

(b) Southern region: 20 sorties flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and altitudes of 8,000 to 9,000 metres, centred on Nasiriyah, Samawah, Qurnah, Salman, Jalibah, Qal'at Salih and Busayyah.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25779
14 May 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 14 MAY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to present to you the enclosed letter, dated 14 May 1993, from my President to Your Excellency.

May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating this letter and its enclosure as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Ambassador
and
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 14 May 1993 from the President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Security Council

Despite the 8 May signed agreement on a cease-fire, the aggressor has launched the new, heavy offensive on Brčko. The town is attacked by more than 30 tanks, artillery and infantry. Some of our defence lines were cut through and hand-to-hand combat has already been registered.

The aggressor is concentrating his forces in this region in a quantity of 15,000 men with the engagement of a tank battalion. Over 20 flights of enemy helicopters carrying troops were registered yesterday.

The lives of 50,000 people of Brčko are in danger.

I protest against this offensive of Serbian paramilitary units and ask you to do everything you can to stop it. I ask you to help the deathly jeopardized population of Brčko.

Expecting your urgent intervention, please accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Aliya IZETBEGOVIĆ
President of the Presidency
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25780
14 May 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 14 MAY 1993 FROM THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I am writing to you in connection with the letter dated 10 May 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Croatia to the United Nations (S/25748) addressed to you.

It is deeply regrettable and disturbing that the Government of Croatia, in an apparent effort to stave off condemnation and evade responsibility for the Croatian offensive in central Bosnia has tried to put the blame on the Serbian side.

It is indeed absurd and an outrageous example of hypocrisy that the Government of Croatia is pointing the finger "at Serbian aggression against the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina" when the Security Council has strongly condemned this major military offensive launched by Bosnian Croat paramilitary units which is totally inconsistent with the signature of the peace plan by the Bosnian Croat side.

At a juncture when it is becoming vividly plain that what is at stake in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a cruel and tragic civil war based on ethnic and religious differences in which no party is innocent, the Government of Croatia has once again resorted to well-worn falsehoods of alleged Serbian aggression. As can be deduced from the reports of the Secretary-General, the only aggressor in Bosnia and Herzegovina are the regular forces of the Croatian army, 40,000 to 50,000 of which occupy western Herzegovina.

While "ethnic cleansing" is being carried out against all non-Croats in Croat-held territories in Bosnia and Herzegovina in full view of UNPROFOR and the international community, which has resulted in a strong rebuke by the Security Council, the Government of Croatia, by cynically condemning the Serbian side for alleged aggression in Bosnia and Herzegovina, is trying to divert attention from the responsibility of the Bosnian Croat side for the hostilities which it is undertaking in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dragomir DJOKIC
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25781
14 May 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 14 MAY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On many occasions, including in several Security Council and General Assembly documents, various high-ranking officials of a country provisionally referred to as the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" have reiterated that there is no territorial claim of that country towards its neighbours, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia. I would like to present evidence that seriously contradicts these statements.

Enclosed, Excellency, please find a colour laser-copy of a personal identification card issued in Mirkovci - a settlement with a pre-war population of approximately 3,500, in the district of Vinkovci in the territory of the Republic of Croatia - but, in the document, it is considered a part of the so-called "Republic of Serbian Krajina" that allegedly forms part of the country provisionally referred to as the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)".

The enclosed document written in the Cyrillic alphabet, states as follows:

1. COVER:

Historical coat of arms of Serbia; underneath inscription: "Krajina"; two marks on the left side are result of rivets affixing the photograph on the inside.

2. INSIDE CONTENTS:

Left: - historical coat of arms of Serbia; underneath inscription: "Krajina"
- inscription: "FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA"
"REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA"
"Mirkovci [district]"
"erased [name]"
"erased [family name]"
"erased [name of one of the parents]"
"erased [day, month and year of birth]"
"erased"
"erased [place of birth, district]"
serial number: "RSK001xxxx erased"

170593

Right: - photograph (riveted) to the left;
- seal overlapping the photograph, with historical coat of arms of Serbia [underneath inscription: "Krajina"], text reading: "REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA"; "Ministry of Internal Affairs-Knin"; "Secretariat [office] of Internal Affairs"; "VUKOVAR"; Roman number "V" [five]
- "blank [personal No.]"
- "erased; district of Mirkovci: erased [domicile and address]"
- "permanent [expiration]"
- "erased [registration No.]"
- "erased [date of issue]"
- seal; identical as above
- signature illegible "[authorized signature]"

All the personal information that could lead to the identification of the person that appears on the ID card have been blackened in order to ensure privacy and prevent any repressive measures that the insurgent authorities could undertake against that person or the next of kin. However, the original document will be made available for inspection to interested delegations upon request, with the obligation to ensure the confidentiality of the information contained therein.

It is the conviction of my Government that this document provides testimony of Serbian nationalist and extremist strivings towards establishment of a "Greater Serbia" that would include various parts of the Republic of Croatia. It is not only the Serbian paramilitary insurgents on Croatian soil who are constantly pushing towards that goal. They are instigated and assisted by the Belgrade regime.

This clearly shows that all the statements of the government representatives from Belgrade have been given mala fidae, and that the Belgrade regime has every intention to annex the occupied parts of the Republic of Croatia that form United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) to the country provisionally referred to as the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)".

If the authorities in Belgrade are indeed serious in their statements about no territorial claims towards Croatia, they would have already recognized the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia.

I would ask for your kind assistance for circulating this letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ambassador Mario NOBILO
Permanent Representative

ANNEX

ЛИЧНА КАРТА


САВЕЗНА РЕПУБЛИКА ЈУГОСЛАВИЈА
РЕПУБЛИКА СРПСКА КРАЈИНА
Мирковци


Мирковци
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NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25782
14 May 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 14 MAY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF PAKISTAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On behalf of the members of the Security Council that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (Cape Verde, Djibouti, Morocco, Pakistan and Venezuela), I have the honour to transmit herewith a memorandum containing our views and concerns with regard to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

I should be grateful if this letter, along with its enclosure, is kindly circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Jamsheed K. A. MARKER
Permanent Representative

Annex

Memorandum dated 14 May 1993 containing the views and concerns of the members of the Security Council that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries with regard to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The members of the Security Council that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (Cape Verde, Djibouti, Morocco, Pakistan and Venezuela), in view of the prevailing uncertainties and lack of clear direction as regards the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, have found it necessary to convey to the Security Council the following views and concerns:

1. The efforts of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, as well as those of international humanitarian organizations, particularly the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), for the provision of humanitarian relief assistance to the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina are most admirable. The international effort led by the United States of America to air-drop humanitarian relief assistance to isolated pockets in that country is also commendable.

2. Nevertheless, throughout this conflict, the Council has been fundamentally unable to discharge its full responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security. The collective security system, as envisaged in the Charter, has failed to redress this tragic situation. This is evident from the fact that over two thirds of the country has been forcefully occupied by Serbs, whose aggression continues even as we speak. The international community continues to remain ineffective in responding to this aggression. On the other hand, Bosnia and Herzegovina has been effectively deprived of exercising its inherent right, enshrined in Article 51 of the Charter, to individual or collective self-defence, in what has been called a "moral rape" of that Republic.

3. The Caucus shares the position that there are now no alternatives to the peace plan. Nevertheless, serious doubts persist as to whether the Serbs will allow a peaceful settlement of the conflict in accordance with the plan. The signatures attached to the plan by the leadership of the three Bosnian communities have not prevented continued hostilities. This, in turn, raises a number of questions as to whether the political and military components of the plan can or will ever be implemented in the light of the realities of the situation. It also raises the question whether, and until when, the Council is prepared to take measures if the Serbs continue to reject the plan. If it is accepted, but not implemented, is the Council prepared to take enforcement measures to secure its implementation?

4. Successive measures have been adopted by the Council to limit the scope of the war, cope with its humanitarian consequences and sanction those, be it individuals or States, who have been deemed to have shared responsibilities bearing on the prevailing situation. Nevertheless, these measures, although designed to buttress the peace plan and cope with emergency situations, increasingly are becoming an end in themselves, instead of addressing the realities of the situation. These steps have not been able to curtail a

continued deterioration of the political and humanitarian situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, nor do they allow for any clear guidance as to how or when the international community will be able to shift the focus of its policies from such piece-meal measures to comprehensive peace-keeping and post-conflict peace-building. Since the London International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and up to the Vance-Owen plan, the Serbs have repeatedly deceived the international community and reneged on their commitments. The Serbs have used the negotiating process and the Vance-Owen plan not as a means to a peaceful solution, but as a vehicle for procrastination and for gaining international legitimacy.

5. It is regretted that in Athens the United Nations accepted that the Serb Party made a reservation to its signature of the peace plan under the representation of a non-existent republic and a so-called parliament. The Caucus believes that the international community should not have witnessed the signature of such document.

6. The scope of the risks faced by the international community, should the conflict not be contained and brought to an immediate end, are of such importance and magnitude that alternative policy options must be explored in order to cope with the intolerable developments presently fostering a continuation of the hostilities, the humanitarian crisis and the commission of crimes of genocide and ethnic cleansing.

7. It was in this context that the Caucus proposed the concept of guaranteed and protected safe areas which were regrettably not accepted at the time of the consideration of resolutions 819 (1993) and 824 (1993). The Caucus reiterates that such guaranties and protection are indispensable. Without them, as has been proven by recent developments, such safe areas provide no help to their inhabitants but rather force them into helpless submission.

8. The Caucus equally finds that both a lifting of the arms embargo and military action to eliminate heavy weapons continue to be, under the circumstances, options to deal with the crisis and to create conditions favourable to the viability of the peace plan. The Caucus believes that UNPROFOR should be given a mandate and resources commensurate with the humanitarian responsibilities with which it has been entrusted, in particular, as regards unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance. The Caucus equally insists that safe areas can and should be guaranteed and protected by UNPROFOR if, at all, any purpose is to be served by such a concept.

9. It has been argued by some that humanitarian assistance cannot be delivered through forceful action. The point has been reached in which the continued effort to negotiate humanitarian initiatives seriously impairs the stated goals of the international community. The Caucus believes that actions, such as those indicated above, are necessary and appropriate in the present circumstances. Not to have used or threatened to use enforcement measures will inevitably lead to a much more substantial use of force in the future. The repeated statements that force would never be used undermined the plan itself from the beginning and encouraged the aggressors. We should have all learned the most important lesson in this conflict: that the international community will not be respected until it decides to take effective actions.

10. The objective behind the Security Council decision to deploy UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina was to put an end to the mass killings, the practice of "ethnic cleansing" and the annihilation of a people. In spite of the fact that the force was established under Chapter VII, its functions have been narrowly interpreted and its focus limited to the provision of humanitarian assistance and that, too, based on the consent of the perpetrators of the aggression. This restrictive interpretation, coupled with the denial of the inherent right of Bosnia and Herzegovina to invoke Article 51 of the Charter, has encouraged the Serbs to continue with their aggression. The Croats are now drawing their own lessons from this policy as evidenced by their recent major offensive. Time is running out for the victims of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Time is only on the side of the aggressors.

11. In view of these considerations, the members of the Security Council that are members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries strongly appeal to other Council members to consider immediately the adoption of the following measures:

(a) New UNPROFOR mandate: A new and effective mandate for UNPROFOR with a substantial increase in its strength to enable it to provide protection and security to the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina in addition to the provision of humanitarian assistance. In this connection, the following steps are necessary:

(i) A redeployment of UNPROFOR to provide adequate and effective protection and security to Sarajevo, Tuzla, Gorazde, Srebrenica, Bihac and Zepa as safe areas;

(ii) To oversee and monitor the withdrawal of all heavy weapons of all the parties from these areas;

(iii) To authorize Member States to undertake all necessary measures against heavy weapons that are not removed from designated areas;

(iv) To authorize Member States to undertake all necessary measures, including military air strikes, with a view to ensuring the safety and security of United Nations personnel and the population under its protection if attacked;

(b) Right of self-defence: Recognize the inherent right of self-defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a sovereign State Member of the United Nations, under Article 51 of the Organization's Charter;

(c) Possible extension of sanctions to Croatia: Extend economic sanctions to Croatia if within a given time the Croats' offensive actions are not stopped, particularly in the city of Mostar.

12. The preceding measures are necessitated by the tragic situation of a people being ethnically cleansed and living under a most inhumane and barbaric siege in cities and in other small pockets. They are facing a slow process of genocide in open jails like Srebrenica or ethnic cleansing like in the ghost town of Zepa. The Caucus believes that the preceding recommended measures are to be strictly interim in nature and are predicated on the exceptional circumstances of the situation and not in order to perpetuate the gains of ethnic cleansing.

The overall objective is and remains and complete reversal of the consequences of the Serbian aggression.

13. The conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a test for the international community and, in particular, the Security Council. Bosnia and Herzegovina was admitted as a sovereign State Member of the United Nations on 25 June 1992. Since April 1992, Serbia had already embarked on a policy to carve out a Greater Serbia from the territory of former Yugoslavia. It is thus clear that this is not a civil war but rather is an international conflict in which a State enjoying international recognition has been subjected to external aggression.

14. On a larger perspective, the issue at hand is one of whether or not Members of the United Nations can rely on the provisions of the Charter for collective security when their very existence is at risk. In this connection, a special responsibility devolves upon the major Powers, members of the Security Council, to respond effectively to the situation and in conformity with the special status granted to them by the Charter. Failure to do so would have far-reaching consequences for international peace and security. States will necessarily lose confidence in the ability of the Council to safeguard their security as mandated by the Charter. Powers with expansionist ambitions will be emboldened to use force in pursuance of their illegitimate aims. On the other hand, States that feel threatened will have to rely on their national capacity to defend themselves with all the negative implications that this will have on arms build-up.

15. Bosnia and Herzegovina has become a symbol of the resistance to the resurgence of the crime of genocide. Since the beginning of the conflict, there have been more than 100,000 deaths, millions of refugees, thousands of women raped and innumerable cases of torture and detention in the most inhumane conditions. No one can claim ignorance or lack of knowledge of these facts.

16. Today's tragedy of the Bosnian people could become the tragedy of the world tomorrow. The moment has arrived for the Security Council to admit this reality, which the whole world has understood for a long time.

UNITED
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S/25783
14 May 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 13 MAY 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government and with reference to the letter dated 22 February 1993, from the representative of Serbia and Montenegro (S/25318), I have the honour to inform that the Islamic Republic of Iran categorically rejects the allegations contained in the aforementioned letter concerning the violations of United Nations Security Council resolutions 713 (1991) and 724 (1991) and the dispatch of a military delegation to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

It would be highly appreciated if this letter were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kamal KHARRAZI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
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S/25784
15 May 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN PURSUANCE OF PARAGRAPH 6 OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 810 (1993)

1. The Security Council, by paragraph 6 of its resolution 810 (1993) of 8 March 1993, called on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) to continue to make every effort to create and maintain a neutral political environment conducive to the holding of free and fair elections. It also requested me to inform the Council by 15 May 1993 of the conditions and preparations for the election. The present report is submitted in response to that request.

2. I have previously reported to the Security Council on the activities of UNTAC in a series of progress reports and special reports, most recently in the fourth progress report (S/25719) of 3 May 1993. The present report should be read in conjunction with those reports.

3. As the election to be held from 23 to 28 May approaches, the overwhelming majority of the voters in Cambodia, as well as political parties and factions, have made manifest their commitment to the election as the culmination of the peace process. As reported earlier, more than 4.7 million Cambodians, or some 96 per cent of the estimated voters, have registered to vote. At a meeting called on 6 May in Beijing by His Royal Highness Prince Norodom Sihanouk, three of the four factions - Front uni national pour un Cambodge indépendant, neutre, pacifique et coopératif (FUNCINPEC), Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) and the Party of the State of Cambodia (SOC) - reaffirmed their support for the election, a commitment that was reiterated by them at a working session of the Supreme National Council (SNC) on 10 May. At the latter meeting, Mr. Son Sann, the leader of KPNLF/Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP - a political party of KPNLF) proposed the suspension of the electoral process and postponement of the election, but the SNC did not pursue the proposal and BLDP has continued to campaign.

4. Since the official start of the electoral campaign on 7 April, the 20 political parties registered to contest the election have campaigned actively and vigorously. Scores of political meetings and rallies have been held daily and peacefully with the participation of tens of thousands of people in virtually all parts of Cambodia. Although FUNCINPEC and the BLDP have complained that SOC has sought to prevent their supporters from attending their meetings, in UNTAC's view, neither such attempts nor political attacks and

intimidation to which they have been subjected have prevented these parties from conducting an active campaign. UNTAC itself has also organized multi-party meetings.

5. Technical preparations for the election have been virtually completed. Some 900 International Polling Station Officers recruited from 44 countries and the Inter-Parliamentary Union have arrived to take part in a three-day training course being held from 13 to 15 May in Thailand. They will be joined by 130 from the United Nations Secretariat as well as about 370 detailed from within UNTAC and will arrive at their duty stations in Cambodia by 18 May. Their duties, and the polling process in general, are described in section D of my fourth progress report.

6. At the meeting of the Supreme National Council held on 21 April 1993, my Special Representative expressed the view that the freeness and fairness of the election would be judged in accordance with three main criteria: the extent to which the campaign and voting are marred by violence, intimidation and harassment; the extent to which SOC, which controls the largest zones and has the most extensive administrative structure, enjoys unfair advantages, whether by using its administrative apparatus for its own political ends or by denying other political parties access to the public media; and the technical conduct of the poll. While these are addressed in the present report, the final assessment will be made after the election.

7. The measures taken by UNTAC to control the existing administrative structures have been described in detail in my previous reports. UNTAC's more recent efforts to promulgate a code of conduct for military and police personnel and civil servants and to prevent the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) from using the resources and staff of the administrative apparatus for electoral purposes have also been described. UNTAC has vigorously raised the issue of the separation of party and State several times both in public and in private meetings with the leading figures of the Phnom Penh authorities. My Special Representative recently announced that an officer of the Cambodian People's Armed Force (CPAF) and a district chief of the CPP had been removed from the register of voters for improper conduct in violation of the Electoral Law.

8. UNTAC has taken particular issue with the Phnom Penh authorities over the access of other political parties to the media and their right to freedom of movement. As a result of strong intervention by UNTAC, FUNCINPEC was able to obtain the release from SOC of the television broadcasting equipment it had imported for campaign purposes. All political parties have had access to UNTAC information media, and three parties - FUNCINPEC, BLDP and the Neutral Democratic Party of Cambodia - have requested and been granted assistance from UNTAC with air transport facilities for campaign purposes.

9. Radio UNTAC now broadcasts 15 hours a day. This has enabled it to intensify a message central to UNTAC's electoral education campaign, namely, that all votes are secret. The leaders of all three factions participating in the election have agreed to my Special Representative's proposal to appear with him on television to reassure voters about the secrecy of the ballot. UNTAC is satisfied that its electoral procedures fully protect the secrecy of the ballot, and that this message has been conveyed to Cambodian voters.

10. It is evident that incidents of violence can have a disruptive effect on even a carefully prepared election especially through their destabilizing psychological effects. Following the killing of a United Nations Volunteer serving as a District Electoral Supervisor and his interpreter in Kompong Thom Province on 8 April, some 60 United Nations Volunteers have withdrawn from their posts. Since document S/25669, in which I reported on a number of incidents of attacks against UNTAC personnel, and my fourth progress report (S/25719) were issued, the security situation in Cambodia has been marked by further acts of violence. While it is not possible to classify all acts of violence or to determine who was responsible, there are essentially four categories of violence: (a) killings of Cambodians, including those of Vietnamese ancestry, by the forces of PDK, the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK), in an effort both to disrupt the election and, evidently, to pressure those of Vietnamese ancestry to leave Cambodia; (b) attacks and harassment by SOC elements aimed at intimidating other political parties, primarily FUNCINPEC; (c) attacks on UNTAC personnel; and (d) random violence associated with banditry and lawlessness.

11. Since the beginning of April, despite initial indications of a relative decline in violence during that month, UNTAC investigations have confirmed that 110 Cambodians, including those of Vietnamese descent, have died as victims of violence and a further 179 have been injured. A large number of these casualties have resulted from attacks on civilians and on SOC by NADK and by unidentified groups, and attacks on other political parties by SOC and unidentified groups. UNTAC will publish shortly the results of all its investigations into serious acts of violence, harassment and intimidation since 1 March 1993.

12. I regret to report that further attacks against UNTAC personnel have occurred since the issuance of the fourth progress report on UNTAC. On 4 May 1993, an UNTAC convoy was ambushed by an unidentified armed group in Banteay Meancheay Province. In the evening of the same day, NADK elements attacked the Chinese Engineering Company and the Polish Logistics Company in Kompong Thom Province with rockets and small arms fire. In the early hours of 7 May 1993 a group of unidentified armed men attacked the UNTAC office in Thpong district in Kompong Speu Province with mortars, rockets and small arms fire. On 8 May 1993, a Pakistani Company came under fire at Choam Khsan in Preah Vihear Province by NADK elements. On 11 May, two unidentified men threw two hand grenades towards a car driven by a Civilian Police officer in Sisophon.

13. In these incidents, two UNTAC personnel died and 17 others were wounded, several of them seriously. Since the inception of UNTAC, 13 UNTAC civilian and military personnel have lost their lives and 52 have been wounded as a result of hostile action; 39 have died from other causes.

14. In the light of PDK's repeatedly expressed intention to oppose the election, including by violent means, as well as in response to the incidents described above, UNTAC has further refined and elaborated its security plans. Thus, no polling will be conducted in the areas controlled by PDK, to which UNTAC has not been permitted access, as well as some remote areas in which NADK have been operating. These areas, mainly located in Siem Reap and Kompong Thom provinces, are thinly populated. Other parts of the country have been designated as high-, medium- and low-risk zones, with low-risk zones

predominating in the heavily populated south and east of the country, including the capital, Phnom Penh. The status of every district in the country is being reviewed on a daily basis by sector commanders of the Military Component, who have overall responsibility for all UNTAC personnel in the sector, and electoral officials on the basis of the latest security information; this daily review will continue during the election itself.

15. Different levels of security measures have been established for each level of risk involving fixed guards, mobile patrols and general area security in accordance with the security arrangements described in the fourth progress report (S/25719, para. 37). In high-risk zones, armed UNTAC military personnel will be stationed at and around polling stations. Physical fortifications have been strengthened and staff will be issued protective gear. Quick Reaction Forces and medical support units have also been identified for the high-risk sites.

16. In response to the heightened threat in Kompong Thom Province, UNTAC civilian personnel have been withdrawn from some locations and the number of polling sites has been reduced from 102 to 51. Civilian staff, including Civilian Police monitors, can now seek direct protection from the Indonesian Battalion of the Military Component in the towns of Kompong Thom, Stung and Baray. In Siem Reap Province, personnel of all components can now be accommodated with military units every evening. Similar arrangements can be made in other provinces if necessary.

17. The first, precautionary stage of the five-stage Mission Security Plan, has now been declared for the entire country. Movement in the provinces is now subject to authorization and monitoring by sector commanders of the UNTAC Military Component and, where possible, takes place in convoys.

18. In order to further strengthen security during the election, urgent consultations have been held in recent days with a number of Governments on the provision of additional equipment for UNTAC. In this connection, I would like to express my appreciation to the Governments of Australia, Japan, Malaysia, Namibia and the United States of America for the additional material assistance and voluntary financial contributions they have provided. Discussions are continuing with a number of other Governments. Meanwhile, essential items for enhanced security have been shipped to the mission.

19. While evidently there can be no guarantee of total safety, all possible steps have been taken to ensure the maximum security that are consistent with UNTAC's character as a peace-keeping operation and with the need to attract the highest possible voter turnout. None the less, it bears repeating that it is on the Cambodian parties that the primary responsibility rests for the maintenance of security in the zones they control. In this connection, the three Cambodian factions supporting the election have recently requested that UNTAC return to them the weapons they deposited with it in implementation of the second phase of the cease-fire in accordance with the Paris Agreements. In view of its implications, especially regarding the security situation, I am giving this request urgent and close consideration.

20. It is now evident that, despite the demonstrated interest of the Cambodian people to determine their future at the polls, and the meticulous preparations

by UNTAC for the election, the conditions for the election are not those anticipated in the Paris Agreements. This results from the unfortunate attitude of PDK, which, having progressively withdrawn from the peace process starting with the military provisions, has now moved from boycotting the election to attempts to actively disrupt it through violence. Such actions constitute a clear breach of solemn commitments. I am certain that the members of the Security Council share my determination not to allow these actions to deny Cambodians this opportunity, carefully nurtured by the international community, to secure peace through the democratic process.

21. It is regrettable that SOC also has contributed, although to a lesser extent, towards the climate of violence by resorting to intimidation of other political parties. Further, it has not responded satisfactorily to UNTAC's efforts to prevent the use of its administrative structure for political purposes.

22. It therefore must be borne in mind that the approaching election in Cambodia is likely to be affected by continuing violence, although UNTAC will continue to do its utmost in providing security measures. Unfortunately, this is a feature in many other countries even when elections are held in far more favourable conditions, rather than in the wake of a prolonged and bitter conflict that has left a legacy of tensions and deep distrust as is the case in Cambodia. As noted in paragraph 140 of my fourth progress report, it would be unrealistic to hold Cambodia to standards valid in countries that enjoy stability or established democratic traditions. UNTAC, therefore, will be conducting the most impartial election that is possible in conditions that are not susceptible to its full control. It would be ingenuous to expect that a postponement would bring improved conditions - the contrary is more probable.

23. It is appropriate to recall that H.R.H. Prince Norodom Sihanouk, who has guided his country through far more difficult times, has supported the election, and recently has encouraged his compatriots to participate in this singular opportunity. This lends further credibility to the electoral process. I remain convinced that he has a crucial role to play at this critical juncture in fostering national reconciliation and promoting stability in the post-election period.

24. It is clear to me that it is the will and intent of the Security Council as well as of the vast majority of the Cambodian people that the election be held as scheduled. With this and all the preceding considerations in view, I have directed that this should be done.